Dillweed Namespace Stewardship Office · Operations Charter

DNSO Operations Charter

Operational procedures, service commitments, and stewardship practice for the Dillweed Namespace Stewardship Office during the founding phase.

The Governance Framework defines who holds authority. This charter defines how that authority is exercised — the day-to-day operational practices that make the namespace trustworthy, not just governed.

Version1.0.3
IssuedMay 2026
PhaseFounding
StatusOperational
Stack Family2026.04
Domaindillweed.com
§ 01

Purpose

This charter defines the operational practices of the Dillweed Namespace Stewardship Office (DNSO) — the founding steward body responsible for operating the Dillweed Namespace during the founding phase. It translates the authority structures defined in the Governance Framework into concrete procedures: how trust is attested, how keys are managed, how revocations are executed, how incidents are handled, and what operational commitments the DNSO makes to the ecosystem.

This charter is a working document. It describes what the DNSO actually does, not aspirational standards that exceed current operational capacity. Commitments stated here are commitments the founding steward can keep.

Conformance Terminology

The key words MUST, MUST NOT, REQUIRED, SHALL, SHALL NOT, SHOULD, SHOULD NOT, RECOMMENDED, MAY, and OPTIONAL in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC 2119] [RFC 8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. Most of this charter is operational prose; normative language is used sparingly and concentrates in §5 (key custody), §6 (revocation), §7 (disclosure windows), §8 (incident response), and §9 (registry operations). Internal organizational language about how the DNSO conducts its own work is deliberately left in plain prose. The service-level posture in §10 is stated as honest best effort during the founding phase and is not written as RFC 2119 commitments.

§ 02

Scope and Authority Boundaries

This charter governs DNSO operational practice during the founding phase of the Dillweed Namespace Project. It operates within a defined stack of governing documents, each with distinct authority over different aspects of the project.

Cross-document version references in this and other Dillweed specifications are shown at major.minor granularity (e.g., v0.4 rather than v0.4.1) by deliberate convention, to keep architectural cross-references stable across patch releases. Exact current versions of each document are tracked in the Standards Overview's maturity table.

DocumentAuthorityThis Charter's Relationship
Governance Framework v1.1Authority structure, stewardship roles, amendment process, successionDefers to. This charter does not redefine governance structure — it operationalizes it.
Namespace Standard v0.4Naming model, URI syntax, trust tier definitionsDefers to. Trust tier definitions used in this charter are those defined in the Namespace Standard.
Registry Specification v0.1Data model, signing authority, registration validation, revocation semanticsDefers to. Operational procedures in this charter implement the registry spec's requirements.
DillClaw Resolver Specification v0.1Resolution protocol, query handling, trust scoringInformed by. Resolver behavior affects how DNSO attestation decisions propagate to consumers.
Anthill Observability Plane v0.1Signal taxonomy, aggregation, anomaly detectionInformed by. Anthill provides the observational instrumentation for several procedures in this charter.
Continuity Protocol GSP-01 v1.0Succession mechanics, key custody transfer, stewardship continuityDefers to for succession, continuity transition, and delegated key-custody transfer procedures referenced in §5 and in matters of stewardship transition.
This Charter (DNSO Operations Charter v1.0.3)Day-to-day DNSO operating proceduresAuthoritative for operational practice. Does not supersede any of the above.

2.1 Conflict Resolution

In the event of an apparent conflict between this charter and any of the above documents, the following precedence order applies: Governance Framework, then Namespace Standard, then Registry Specification, then DillClaw Resolver Specification, then this DNSO Operations Charter, then Anthill Observability Plane Specification. For matters of stewardship succession, key custody transfer, or continuity transition, GSP-01 (Continuity Protocol) controls within the scope delegated to it by the Governance Framework. Conflicts SHOULD be logged as amendment candidates for the affected document rather than resolved through informal interpretation. The founding steward is responsible for identifying and surfacing such conflicts.

Founding Phase Scope

The procedures in this charter apply during the founding phase as defined in the Governance Framework §4.2. As the project transitions to multi-stakeholder governance, this charter will be superseded by or incorporated into a successor operations document adopted through the formal amendment process.

§ 03

DNSO Mission and Responsibilities

The DNSO is the operational steward of the Dillweed Namespace. Its mission is to maintain the namespace as a neutral, trustworthy, and durable coordination layer for AI agent capability discovery — operated in the interest of the ecosystem, not any single participant.

3.1 Core Responsibilities

  • Registry operation — Maintain the authoritative Dillweed Registry, initially in local founding-phase deployment and later at a stable public endpoint, ensuring records are durably stored, cryptographically signed, and accurately served.
  • Trust attestation — Review and confirm trust tier elevations to verified and canonical for qualifying registrants.
  • Key custody — Maintain exclusive custody of the DNSO Ed25519 signing keypair with appropriate security and backup procedures.
  • Revocation authority — Exercise revocation authority promptly when required by governance or security events.
  • Public disclosure — Maintain transparency with the ecosystem through timely disclosure of governance events, key operations, and material operational changes.
  • Spec stewardship — Maintain and evolve the specification stack in accordance with the governance framework's amendment procedures.
  • Neutrality preservation — Decline arrangements that would compromise the namespace's neutrality thesis, as defined in the Governance Framework §3.
§ 04

Trust Tier Attestation

Trust tier attestation is the process by which the DNSO confirms that a self-declared verified or canonical tier declaration is substantiated. Until the DNSO issues attestation, such declarations are provisional and resolvers apply weighting penalties as specified in the Registry Specification §7.

4.1 Attestation Process — Verified Tier

1

Attestation Request

Registrant submits an attestation request via the DNSO contact channel, referencing the registered capability by name and version, and providing evidence of operator identity (organizational domain, publicly verifiable contact).

2

Identity Verification

The DNSO confirms the registrant controls the domain or organizational identity associated with the capability endpoint. This is typically accomplished through DNS TXT record verification using a DNSO-issued challenge string at a DNSO-published record name, organizational contact confirmation against a published address of record, or an equivalent mechanism agreed with the registrant at the start of the attestation.

3

Endpoint Review

The DNSO confirms the registered endpoint is live, responsive, and consistent with the registered schema. A minimum 30-day active registration history is required before a verified attestation may be issued.

4

Attestation or Decline

The DNSO issues attestation by executing POST /promote with the confirmed tier, logging the attestation event to the audit trail. If declined, the DNSO notifies the registrant with a reason and any remediation path. Evidence used to support a verified attestation MUST be retained in the DNSO operational log for at least the lifetime of the attestation and 12 months thereafter.

4.2 Attestation Process — Canonical Tier

The canonical tier is DNSO-designated only and is not available by registrant request. The DNSO may designate a canonical capability when a clear reference implementation exists for a namespace category and no reasonable dispute about its primacy exists. Canonical designations are logged publicly and may be withdrawn if circumstances change.

4.3 Attestation Response Time

During the founding phase, the DNSO acknowledges attestation requests within 14 calendar days of receipt. Substantive attestation decisions are targeted as capacity permits and are not subject to a fixed completion deadline. Acknowledgment is a commitment to confirm receipt and note that review is underway; it is not a commitment to a substantive decision within the same window. See §10 for the full service level posture.

Provisional Tier Behavior

A self-declared verified or canonical record is signed by the DNSO at registration time — the signature attests that the DNSO wrote the record, not that the tier is confirmed. Resolvers distinguish attested from provisional tiers via the presence of a provisional_tier audit log entry without a corresponding promote entry.

§ 05

Key Management

The DNSO Ed25519 signing keypair is the cryptographic root of trust for the entire namespace. During the founding phase, all authoritative Capability Records are signed with the DNSO private key. Its integrity and security are the single most critical operational responsibility of the DNSO.

5.1 Key Custody Requirements

  • Storage — Private key MUST be stored at file mode 0600 on the registry host, outside the database, and MUST NOT be committed to version control.
  • Backup — At minimum two encrypted backup copies on physically separate media (for example, an encrypted USB drive in a separate physical location, and an encrypted password manager vault) MUST be maintained. Backup integrity MUST be verified at least monthly.
  • Transmission — Private key MUST NOT be transmitted over any network interface. The public key is published at dillweed.com/dnso_public.pem over HTTPS.
  • Access — Private key access is restricted to the founding steward during the founding phase. An access log MUST be maintained.

5.2 Planned Key Rotation

The DNSO SHOULD perform planned key rotation at intervals no greater than 24 months. Rotation procedure:

1

Announce rotation

Public disclosure of planned rotation at least 30 days in advance, specifying the overlap window start and end dates.

2

Generate new keypair

New Ed25519 keypair generated. During the overlap window, the DNSO public-key endpoint at dillweed.com/dnso_public.pem may publish both the current and prior public keys, labeled by key identifier and validity window. The prior key also remains available at /pubkey?previous=true on the registry endpoint for the duration of the overlap (Registry Specification §5.6). This registry-served prior key is for operational discovery and mirror compatibility; canonical verification relies on the DNSO-published public key material at the stable public-key URL.

3

Overlap window (minimum 30 days)

Current and prior public keys remain discoverable during the overlap window. Resolvers that have cached the prior key continue to verify existing records while refreshing to the new key at their next scheduled cycle.

4

Re-sign all active records

All active Capability Records MUST be re-signed under the new key before the prior key is retired.

5

Retire prior key

Prior key removed from public endpoint. Rotation completion disclosed publicly. Audit log entry recorded.

5.3 Emergency Keypair Reset

If the private key is compromised or lost, an emergency keypair reset is required. This is a registry trust reset event: all existing signatures become unverifiable under the old key. The DNSO MUST immediately generate a new keypair, publish the new public key, re-sign all active records, and issue a public disclosure with the nature of the incident and remediation steps taken. Emergency resets are logged as critical incidents under §8.

§ 06

Revocation Procedures

Revocation is the governance mechanism that makes trust tiers meaningful. The DNSO exercises revocation authority to remove bad actors, retire stale capabilities, and maintain the integrity of the namespace.

6.1 Revocation Triggers

  • Endpoint failure — A registered endpoint has been unreachable for 90 consecutive days with no registrant contact.
  • Identity fraud — A registrant is found to have misrepresented their organizational identity during attestation.
  • Malicious capability — A registered capability is found to cause harm to consuming agents or their operators.
  • Governance violation — A registrant has violated the terms under which a tier was attested.
  • Registrant request — The registrant requests retirement of their own capability.
  • Namespace collision — A registration is found to conflict with an existing canonical capability in a way that creates harmful ambiguity.

6.2 Revocation Process

1

Notice (where feasible)

Where the revocation trigger is not an emergency and registrant contact exists, the DNSO provides 7 days advance notice of intended revocation, allowing the registrant to respond or remediate.

2

Execute revocation

DNSO executes POST /revoke with a documented reason string. Revoked records are retained in the audit log indefinitely per Registry Specification §8.1.

3

Log and disclose

Revocation is logged to the registration audit trail. Revocations for governance or security reasons are publicly disclosed per §7. Registrant-requested retirements are logged but not individually disclosed unless the registrant requests it.

6.3 Emergency Revocation

For malicious capabilities or active security incidents, the DNSO MAY execute immediate revocation without advance notice. Emergency revocations MUST be disclosed publicly within 48 hours of execution.

Where immediate public disclosure of technical detail would materially worsen active exploitation, the DNSO may withhold technical detail from the initial disclosure while still disclosing that an emergency revocation has occurred and naming the affected capability. Full technical detail MUST follow within 30 days of the emergency revocation, or within 7 days of the upstream vulnerability being patched, whichever comes first. The 30-day hard cap protects the disclosure commitment while preserving the active-exploitation carve-out; it is not extensible by the DNSO acting alone.

§ 07

Public Disclosure Obligations

Transparency is a core operating principle of the DNSO. The following events require timely public disclosure at dillweed.com or an equivalent canonical disclosure channel:

EventDisclosure WindowRequired Content
Governance framework amendmentPrior to adoption (30-day notice)Proposed change, rationale, effective date
Continuity trustee designationWithin 30 days of designationDesignation confirmed (identity need not be disclosed)
Planned key rotation30 days prior to overlap window startOverlap window dates, rotation rationale
Emergency keypair resetWithin 48 hoursNature of incident, remediation steps, new public key URL
Governance-triggered revocationWithin 48 hours of revocationCapability name, revocation reason category (detail at DNSO discretion)
Emergency revocation — technical detail30 days after revocation, or 7 days after upstream patch, whichever is earlier (see §6.3)Technical root cause and remediation detail
Foundation formationPrior to executionProposed structure, asset arrangement, continuity role preservation
Major operational change14 days prior where feasibleNature of change, effective date, impact on registrants
Disclosure Principle

Disclosures should be clear, factual, and timely. The goal is to give ecosystem participants the information they need to make informed decisions about their use of the namespace — not to manage reputation or minimize the appearance of problems. Honest disclosure of difficulties builds more durable trust than the appearance of smooth operation.

§ 08

Incident Response

8.1 Incident Classification

ClassDefinitionTarget Response
CriticalPrivate key compromise or loss; registry data corruption; active malicious capability causing harm to agentsImmediate action, public disclosure within 48 hours
HighRegistry unavailability exceeding 4 hours; unauthorized access to write endpoints; identity fraud confirmedResponse within 24 hours, disclosure within 72 hours if public impact
MediumRegistry performance degradation; failed backup verification; unresolved attestation disputeResponse within 7 days
LowRegistrant complaint; minor operational anomaly; documentation gapResponse within 14 days

8.2 Private Key Compromise Response

A compromised private key is the most severe incident the DNSO can face. Upon confirmed or suspected compromise the DNSO MUST:

  • Take the registry offline immediately to prevent further signing under the compromised key
  • Execute emergency keypair reset per §5.3
  • Issue public disclosure within 48 hours including the nature of the compromise, the scope of potentially affected records, and the remediation steps taken
  • Notify any known implementers or institutional partners directly
  • Document the incident fully in the operational log for governance review

8.3 Registry Unavailability

DillClaw Resolvers are designed to operate from cached records during registry downtime, disclosing staleness to callers. Extended unavailability degrades the namespace's utility but does not break existing resolution. The DNSO prioritizes registry restoration and communicates status and estimated restoration time through the public disclosure channel during extended outages.

§ 09

Registry Operational Standards

9.1 Backup and Durability

  • Database backup frequency — A daily automated backup of data/registry.db MUST be written to at least one off-host location.
  • Keypair backup — As specified in §5.1. Backup integrity MUST be verified monthly.
  • Backup restoration test — Full restoration from backup MUST be tested at least once every six months. The target restoration time from the most recent verified backup is 24 hours during the founding phase.
  • Audit log retention — The registration log MUST be retained indefinitely. No rows may be deleted or modified.
  • Operational log integrity — Operational log entries MUST be append-only and MUST NOT be altered retroactively except through superseding correction entries that reference the original entry being corrected. This immutability requirement mirrors the registry's audit discipline and ensures the log remains a reliable governance record.

9.2 Software Maintenance

  • Node.js runtime and better-sqlite3 dependency SHOULD be kept within one major version of current stable release.
  • Security advisories for dependencies MUST be reviewed within 7 days of publication.
  • Registry software updates MUST be tested against the existing database before deployment to the authoritative registry instance.

9.3 Monitoring

During the founding phase the DNSO operates with best-effort monitoring appropriate to a single-steward operation. The /health endpoint is the primary operational signal. External uptime monitoring is recommended but not required in the founding phase. As adoption grows and institutional partners appear, monitoring expectations will be formalized. The Anthill Observability Plane (v0.1) specifies the cross-stack signal taxonomy, aggregation windows, and DNSO review cadences; it specifies how several monitoring obligations described in this charter may be instrumented, aggregated, and reviewed as the project matures.

§ 10

Founding-Phase Service Level Posture

The Dillweed Namespace is operated by a single founding steward. This section states the honest service level posture for the founding phase — not enterprise SLAs, but clear expectations that registrants and implementers can rely on.

During the founding phase, the DNSO prioritizes integrity over availability,
and transparency over the appearance of smooth operation.
Founding Phase — Current Commitments
  • Best-effort availability — no guaranteed uptime percentage
  • No 24/7 staffed response — single steward, human response times
  • Critical security incidents prioritized above all other activity
  • Registry downtime disclosed publicly when exceeding 4 hours
  • Attestation requests acknowledged within 14 days
  • Governance revocations disclosed within 48 hours
  • Backup integrity verified monthly
  • Audit log retained indefinitely, never modified
Post-Founding — Anticipated Evolution
  • Formal uptime SLA as infrastructure partners join
  • Staffed response window commensurate with adoption
  • Defined attestation turnaround SLA
  • External monitoring and status page
  • Multi-party key custody
  • TSC-reviewed operational standards
  • Formal incident post-mortem process
  • Participant Council operational review rights
Honest Posture Principle

Registrants and implementers who rely on the Dillweed Namespace deserve an accurate picture of what it is today. A namespace operated with clear, honest constraints is more trustworthy than one with ambitious commitments it cannot reliably keep. Operational expectations will tighten as adoption grows and the governance structure matures.

§ 11

Communication Channels

During the founding phase, all DNSO communications are channeled through dillweed.com. The following contact categories are recognized:

  • Attestation requests — Registrants seeking trust tier attestation should initiate contact through dillweed.com with the capability name, version, and evidence of operator identity as described in §4.1.
  • Registration inquiries — Questions about namespace path selection, protocol compatibility, or the registration process may be directed through dillweed.com.
  • Security disclosures — Responsible disclosure of security vulnerabilities or operational concerns should be sent to the DNSO contact channel. The DNSO commits to acknowledging security disclosures within 7 days.
  • Institutional partnership — Organizations seeking implementer, contributor, infrastructure partner, or governance participant relationships should initiate contact through dillweed.com, referencing the Governance Framework §7 for the categories of engagement available.
  • Public disclosures — Operational disclosures required under §7 will be published at dillweed.com and referenced from a canonical disclosure record maintained by the DNSO.
§ 12

Charter Amendment

This charter is subject to the amendment process defined in the Governance Framework §5.6. During the founding phase, amendments require concurrence of the founding continuity seat. Once the Technical Steering Committee is constituted, amendments additionally require TSC majority concurrence and 30-day Participant Council review.

Operational changes that do not alter the charter's stated commitments or conflict with the governing documents may be implemented by the founding steward without formal amendment. Changes that reduce stated commitments, alter disclosure obligations, or affect registrant or implementer expectations require formal amendment.

The namespace defines what can exist.
The resolver defines how it is found.
The registry defines what actually exists.
The governance defines who decides.
This charter defines how they do it.
Role in the Dillweed Namespace Stack
The DNSO Operations Charter defines the operational procedures, stewardship obligations, and incident response protocols that translate governance doctrine into day-to-day namespace operations.
System Flow
Namespace Standard Resolver Registry Governance Operations Charter ◀ you are here Anthill Observability GSP-01 Continuity